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Abstract
E-negotiation is a critical activity that is becoming a new reality (Sokolova et al., 2006),
however, the e-negotiation environment lends itself to fewer informative cues than the
face-to-face environment. The ability to maintain relationships with parties and negotiate
with them in the future increases the negotiator’s bargaining power and could be
important beyond economic outcomes (Curhan & Brown, 2011). This study investigates
the link between relationship-building and subjective values in negotiation, and how the
negotiation medium may change this relationship. Subjective values of rapport,
trustworthiness, and interest in future interaction were predicted to both differ by enegotiation and face-to-face negotiation condition and be influenced by the amount of
relationship-building language in the negotiation. Sixty-six same-gender dyads negotiated
either by e-negotiation or in person. The impact of dyadic relationship-building was
tested using the Actor-Partner Interdependence Model (Kenny et al., 2002). Results found
that the amount of relationship-building was not associated with dyadic perceptions of
trustworthiness, rapport, or interest in future interaction. There were no significant
partner effects for relationship-building and the three subjective value outcomes. Finally,
condition did not moderate the link between relationship-building and subjective value
outcomes. Possible explanations of the implications and the lack of findings are
discussed.

Keywords: APIM, e-negotiation, rapport, relationship-building, subjective value,
trustworthiness
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Relationship-building in E-negotiation: Dyadic Effects on Subjective Negotiation
Outcomes
Virtual work has significantly increased as a global pandemic pushed
organizations to adapt quickly and move away from the traditional office model of work.
This, coupled with an increased reliance on technology to manage work, is changing
many elements of traditional work, such as negotiation in the workplace (Naquin &
Paulson, 2003). Negotiation is an essential element used to address workplace issues, and
typically involves interplays between organization members to make work decisions and
allocate resources (Stuhlmacher & Citera, 2005). Electronic negotiations (e-negotiations)
are now “a new reality” as the virtual workplace environment continues to rapidly grow
(Sokolova et al., 2006). E-negotiations and face-to-face (FTF) negotiations are associated
with different types of behaviors, which are predicted to result in different economic and
perceptual negotiation outcomes. There are components of FTF negotiation that do not
exist when negotiating over chat or email, such as cues from body language. This
research compares the two modes of interaction on similarities and differences in
language, a shared component of both FTF and e-negotiation. Language use is expected
to differ and influence both objective and subjective outcomes.
Objective and Subjective Outcomes in Negotiation
Negotiation results in objective or economic outcomes as well as some very
important social-psychological outcomes that are perception based. Objective outcomes
are tangible such as money, point values, or resources whereas social-psychological
outcomes revolve around the attitude and perceptions of negotiators (Curhan & Brown,
2011). In contrast to objective outcomes, Curhan and colleagues (2006) call these social-

3
psychological outcomes “subjective values.” Subjective values are the “social,
perceptual, and emotional consequences of a negotiation” (Curhan et al., 2006, p. 494).
Subjective values are important outcomes in negotiation. Subjective feelings of
success are at times the only benchmark of success that a negotiator has, as it is rare to
know the exact objective value that the negotiator could have maximized (Curhan et al.,
2006). Negotiators often “care more about feeling positive, being respected, or having a
favorable relationship” than the terms of the deal (Curhan & Brown, 2011, p. 580).
Negotiators who have favorable relationships with their counterparts may express the
desire to maintain a working relationship. Studies have found that individuals who
reported high subjective value after negotiations also reported greater willingness to stay
in contact with and negotiate again with their counterpart (Curhan et al., 2006). The
ability to maintain relationships with parties and negotiate with them in the future
increases the negotiator’s bargaining power (Curhan & Brown, 2011). The ability to
maintain relationships and increase subjective value have been found to “pay off” in
terms of objective value over a second negotiation (Curhan et al., 2006). Subjective value
is also linked with commitment to upholding a deal, where negotiators can reasonably
expect their counterpart to follow through on the terms of the negotiation (Curhan &
Brown, 2011). Thus, the quality of the relationship can be more important than objective
terms of the deal (Gelfand et al., 2006).
Subjective outcomes received more attention starting in 2006 with a seminal
paper by Curhan and colleagues. They created a measure of subjective perceptions by
first categorizing aspects of subjective value into four groups: feelings about the
instrumental outcome, feelings about the self, feelings about the negotiation process, and
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feelings about the relationship with the counterpart (Curhan et al., 2006). The latter two
categories (feelings about the negotiation process and feelings about the relationship)
make up the concept of rapport. Rapport is critical to the negotiation task and involves
listening and being listened to, mutual trust, and taking care not to damage the
relationship (Curhan et al., 2006). These issues relate to the process of negotiation and
indicate that people have other values than solely gaining an objective advantage.
Negotiations typically do not occur in a silo; in most cases, people negotiate with others
that they will see and work with again, with friends and family, and with those whose
opinions matter to them. Because subjective values, such as rapport, are important
negotiation outcomes, it is worthwhile to examine how they differ by negotiation mode.
Face-to-Face versus E-negotiation Subjective Outcomes
Comparing processes and subjective outcomes between face-to-face (FTF) and enegotiations is complicated. Negotiations that occur in person allow for negotiators to
obtain contextual information above and beyond the message content. Media richness is
the degree of information that can be conveyed through a communication medium (Poole
et al., 1992). According to media richness theory (Daft & Lengel, 1983), FTF
negotiations are considered the “richest” media because there is immediate feedback and
multiple cues through “body language, tone of voice, and message content” that are
expressed in real time (Daft & Lengel, 1986, p. 560). Richness influences the amount and
ambiguity of information; FTF communication provides more information and less
ambiguity than e-negotiation (Daft & Lengel, 1986). Media richness influences both
objective and subjective outcomes (Curhan & Brown, 2011). There is a general body of
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support that FTF communications foster mutually beneficial objective and subjective
outcomes in negotiation compared to less rich media.
Research often shows more mutually beneficial outcomes for FTF negotiation
compared to the less-rich negotiation. When FTF negotiations were compared to less rich
media, FTF negotiations concluded in less time (an objective outcome) (Drolet & Morris,
2000). Furthermore, parties had a greater desire to work with each other in the future (a
subjective outcome) (Purdy et al., 2000). Bazerman and colleagues (2000) suggest that
FTF negotiations result in negotiators developing a shared mental model whereas this
does not seem to occur via telephone communication. Group interactions that occur via
computer are also slower and rated lower in satisfaction with the process than FTF
interactions (Baltes et al., 2002; Friedman & Belkin, 2013). Online negotiations
compared to FTF negotiations result in lower interest in future relations and less
satisfaction with the negotiation outcome (Naquin & Paulson, 2003), and online
negotiators may be less accurate when judging counterparts’ interests, leading to lower
individual and joint objective value outcomes (Arunachalam & Dilla, 1995).
Advancements in technology have provided the ability to negotiate in many
different ways. Video conferencing, audio-only communication, chatting through instant
messaging systems, and e-mail are all ways that virtual negotiation can take place. The
focus here will be on instant message text-based media, which are considered relatively
low on the media richness scale. The only forms of media considered less rich than
instant message text-based media are formal written documentation, such as bulletins,
and solely numerical data (Daft & Lengel, 1986). Written text-only negotiation is one of
the leanest types of communication due to restricted informational cues. Due to the

6
physical separation and the electronic medium, negotiators typically have less
information about the other party, including fewer nonverbal cues and less understanding
of their counterpart’s initial perceptions than when in a FTF setting (Hine et al., 2009).
Other frameworks offer similar predictions to media richness theory. Social
presence theory (Short et al., 1976) explains the “cues filtered out” phenomenon of
electronic media, arguing that computer-based communication is a cold medium that
removes non-verbal cues and inhibits people from developing personal bonds (Sproull &
Kiesler, 1986). Likewise, the concept of psychological distance is similar to the idea of
information richness. Wellens (1986) suggests that computer-based media leads to more
depersonalization and social awareness than FTF interactions due to fewer informational
cues. Thus, virtual communication encourages feelings of psychological distance, while
FTF communication encourages feelings of psychological closeness (Wellens, 1986).
Psychological distance also has implications for the subjective outcomes between
negotiation counterparts. Lower levels of trust towards the other party are perceived
before, throughout, and after online negotiations compared to FTF negotiations (Naquin
& Paulson, 2003).
On the other hand, social information processing (SIP) theory (Walther, 1992)
paints a less bleak picture of virtual negotiations and uses the “cues filtered out” approach
to argue that meaningful relationships are possible over computer-based interactions with
time. Siegel and colleagues (1986) found that “social equalization” was higher in
computer-based interactions where group members participated more equally in
discussion than in FTF interactions. Another advantage is that some negotiators may
benefit from increased aggressive behavior in e-negotiation to increase objective
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outcomes (Friedman & Belkin, 2013; Rosette et al., 2012). In summary, there is ample
support suggesting that varying modes of interaction are associated with different
negotiation outcomes.
Face-to-Face versus E-Negotiation Processes and Behaviors
In addition to negotiation outcomes, negotiation processes are expected to differ
across modes of interaction. Stuhlmacher and Citera’s meta-analytic study (2005) found
that less hostile behavior occurred in FTF negotiations than in virtual negotiations. When
looking at FTF negotiations through a social awareness lens, heightened awareness and
sensitivity to the other party has been shown to facilitate mutual disclosure, trust, and
reciprocity (McGinn & Croson, 2004). Drolet and Morris (2000) found that participants
developed greater rapport and cooperated more in FTF communication compared to
audio-only communication. Morris and colleagues (2002) found that e-mail negotiators
had a harder time building rapport and had less preference for a working relationship than
FTF negotiators because less personal information was conveyed, and fewer questions
were asked through email. Additionally, Stuhlmacher and Citera (2005) found that
anonymity moderated hostile behavior in negotiations and that more hostile behavior
occurred in negotiations when parties were anonymous compared to identified. They also
found that text and email-based negotiations showed more hostility in general than FTF
negotiations (Stuhlmacher & Citera, 2005). Other studies have also found that online
communication results in more rudeness or impulsivity (Dubrovsky et al., 1991),
aggressive behavior (Keisler et al., 1984), negative attacks, and conflicts (Goleman,
2007).
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Relationship-building Behavior
Nadler and Shestowsky (2006) argue that when negotiations occur online, it is
important to reduce the effects of de-individuation by “making sure that negotiators see
their partners as identifiable human beings.” Focusing solely on gaining the highest
objective outcome in negotiation can hinder the cooperation needed for future exchanges
(Curhan et al., 2006). Relationship-building behavior can enhance cooperation and is an
important facilitator of subjective value in negotiation. Morris and colleagues (2002)
found that e-mail negotiators had a harder time building rapport than FTF negotiators
because less personal information was conveyed, and fewer questions were asked through
email. Relationship-building in negotiations could potentially be a way avoid the
negative repercussions of de-individuation.
Relationship-building behavior can manifest in many ways in negotiation
including humor, asking questions, agreeable language, and small talk or “schmoozing”.
Humor in the negotiation can develop rapport and increase both objective and subjective
outcomes (Curhan & Brown, 2011). Humor in requesting the final offer resulted in
negotiator counterparts making larger concessions, evaluating the negotiation more
positively, and reporting marginally less tension (O’Quin & Aronoff, 1981). Asking
questions in a negotiation has been associated with negotiators perceiving more positivity
towards each other before (Fairfield & Allred, 2007) and after the negotiation, and is a
way to signal interest in the other party’s perspective (Chen et al., 2010). This enhances
the negotiator relationship and counterpart subjective value (Chen et al., 2010). Another
study found that agreeable language (e.g., “alright,” “fine,” “indeed”, etc.) was one of the
strongest predictors of reaching an e-negotiation settlement compared to an impasse
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(Hine et al., 2009). Small talk in negotiation can lead negotiators to express more
willingness to work again with their counterparts (Morris et al., 2002). Making promises
and creating clear consequences for compliance and noncompliance with negotiation
terms were found to enhance the quality of implementing the negotiation contract (Mislin
et al., 2011), and trust has been found to increase as positive interactions between parties
increase (Malholtra & Murnigan, 2002). Thus, of interest in this study, is how subjective
outcomes can increase when relationship-building behavior is used in negotiations.
Relationship-building Behavior and Negotiation Outcomes. A good
relationship can be effective to maintain the good will and cooperation necessary for
greater returns in the long run. (Curhan et al., 2006). Relationship-building behavior can
also lead to higher joint outcomes in negotiation due to information exchange and trust.
Valley and colleagues (1998) found that face-to-face negotiators achieved higher joint
benefit, facilitated by more truth-telling, than negotiators conversing via telephone or in
writing. Asking questions is facilitated by positive regard for the other party and provides
information that yields better understanding of the other party’s values and higher joint
objective value (Fairfield & Allred, 2007). Another study found that sharing personal
information and in-group affiliation in computer-mediated negotiation reduced the rate of
impasse (Moore et al., 1999). Relationship-building behavior can also be thought of as a
facilitator of future objective value. The rapport developed in one negotiation could foster
concern for the other party, facilitate information sharing, and elicit other behaviors that
are imperative for the success of the next negotiation (Curhan et al., 2006). Hine and
colleagues (2009) found that agreeable language was a strong predictor of success in enegotiations where a tone of “assent” appeared to aid a cooperative approach to solving
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problems for shared benefit, whereas a tone of “negate” in the second half of enegotiations indicated a reluctance to make concessions and a potential for impasse.
Trust. Trust and trustworthiness are part of subjective values in negotiation. Trust
refers to a state in which there is an “intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive
expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 395).
Trust consists of an individual’s own intentions towards another party, whereas
trustworthiness is a “characteristic or quality of the other party” and involves the trustor
relating characteristics of the other party and making a judgement about them (Lewicki &
Polin, 2013). Trust and perceived risk are interrelated (Mayer et al., 1995) and people are
more likely to share information when they trust their counterpart (Naquin & Paulson,
2003). Thus, in situations such as negotiation where perceived risk is inherently high,
trust is critical. Trust and cooperation have a cyclical relationship and move the
progression of a negotiation. However, negotiators that are too trusting may disclose
information that makes them vulnerable and may not maximize their economic
negotiation outcomes (Lewicki & Polin, 2013). High candor and trust in negotiations has
been associated with more concessions toward the other (DeRue et al., 2009). On the
other hand, low trust may restrict the flow of information and can make a negotiation
very difficult (Lewicki & Polin, 2013). High trust can offset other concerns about the
integrity and competence of the other party (Olekalns & Smith, 2009).
Trustworthiness is central to the social exchange process (Olekalns & Smith,
2009) and involves a more dyadic look at how negotiators perceive each other. Butler
(1995, 1999) found that initial impressions of trustworthiness determine how willing
negotiators are to share information. Additionally, when negotiators report low trust in
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their counterparts, deception has been found to increase (Olekalns & Smith, 2007, 2009).
Trust and trustworthiness in the other party are clearly important to negotiation.
Trustworthiness. Trustworthiness has been studied as being composed of three
separate dimensions relating to the counterpart: ability, benevolence, and integrity
(Mayer et al., 1995). Ability is defined as “groups of skills, competencies, and
characteristics that enable a party to have influence within some specific domain” (Mayer
et al., 1995, p. 717) and refers to the competence or perceived expertise of the opposing
party. For example, trustworthiness is increased if the other party is seen to have the
ability or expertise to live up to their side of the deal. Benevolence is “the extent to which
a trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor, aside from an egocentric profit
motive,” (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 718) which coincides with perceptions that the trustee
will not try to harm the trustor (Lewicki & Polin, 2013). Benevolence in negotiations is
displayed through courtesy, showing respect, and engaging in an integrative negotiation
process (Lewicki & Polin, 2013). Integrity is how ethical the trustor perceives the other
party to be, including how credible they are and how likely they are to follow through on
their end of the deal (Lewicki & Polin, 2013). Negotiators use informational cues to make
judgements about the other party’s trustworthiness based on ability, benevolence, and
integrity (Lewicki & Polin, 2013).
Rapport. Rapport is a state of mutual positivity that is developed by attention and
involvement, positivity, and coordination (Nadler, 2004b). Rapport develops by smooth
turn-taking in conversation, where the listener acknowledges understanding, agreement,
or attention (Nadler, 2004b). Components of rapport are also linked to nonverbal
expression, which are only accessed when negotiators can see each other (Drolet &
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Morris, 2000). Visual access has been shown to enhance both cooperation and rapport
among players in social dilemma games, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and leads to
better collective outcomes (Nadler, 2004b; Sally, 2000). Without visual access or some
sort of foundation for a positive relationship (e.g., negotiators are friends), negotiators are
less likely to develop rapport that is related to beneficial outcomes in mixed-motive
negotiations (Nadler, 2004b). Still, in an e-negotiation setting, negotiators can practice
strategies to develop rapport with their counterparts. For example, engaging in small talk
has been shown to facilitate cooperation and resulted in favorable impressions of the
counterpart after the negotiation (Nadler, 2004a). Overall, rapport develops relatively
easily in a FTF context, but when required to negotiate via less-rich media, negotiators
can attempt to build a foundation for a positive relationship with their counterpart to
develop rapport and arrive at positive joint outcomes.
Interest in Future Interaction. A final subjective value of interest in this paper is
the negotiator’s interest in negotiating with their counterpart again in the future. An
individual’s desire to negotiate again is related to trust in a negotiation (Naquin &
Paulson, 2003), and can indicate satisfaction with both the counterpart, the process of
negotiation, and resulting outcomes. Purdy and colleagues (2000) found that willingness
to negotiate again was positively related to media richness; specifically, negotiators were
more willing to negotiate again when comparing FTF, videoconference, and telephone
conditions to computer chat conditions. Online negotiations have been found to relate to
less desire for future interaction than those in a FTF negotiation and resulted in less
satisfaction with the negotiation outcome (Naquin & Paulson, 2003). On the other hand,
negotiators who experience greater social, perceptual, and emotional negotiation
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outcomes (components of subjective values) are likely to have more desire to negotiate
again with their counterpart (Curhan et al., 2006). Thus, the e-negotiation environment is
expected to decrease a negotiator’s interest in future interaction with their counterpart
compared to the FTF environment.
Rationale
The current study aims to provide insight into relationship-building behaviors and
subjective values in e-negotiation by contrasting it with FTF negotiation. Success in
negotiation can be viewed through the lens of subjective value outcomes such as rapport,
trustworthiness, and interest in future negotiation interaction. The e-negotiation
environment lends itself to fewer informative cues, and thus less opportunity for positive
negotiation outcomes. According to media richness theory (Daft & Lengel, 1983), the enegotiation environment is less rich than the FTF environment, and FTF communication
provides more information and less ambiguity than e-negotiation (Daft & Lengel, 1986).
Media richness can influence both objective and subjective outcomes (Curhan & Brown,
2011). Because the virtual space is associated with less rich media, e-negotiation is
associated with less post-negotiation trust (Lewicki & Polin, 2013), lower development
of rapport (Nadler, 2004b), and less desire to negotiate with the counterpart again
(Naquin & Paulson, 2003).
This thesis examines if negotiators who utilize relationship-building enhance their
and their counterparts’ subjective perceptions of success in negotiation. The ability to
maintain relationships with parties and negotiate with them in the future increases the
negotiator’s bargaining power and could be important beyond solely economic outcomes
(Curhan & Brown, 2011). Thus, I hope to examine how interacting through different
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forms of communication media, negotiators might use strategies that increase beneficial
subjective value outcomes.
Hypotheses
Because relationship-building is hypothesized to relate to joint outcomes in
negotiation (Fairfield & Allred, 2007; Valley et al., 1998) as well as individual outcomes
(Curhan et al., 2006; Hine et al., 2009), hypotheses are discussed at both the dyad level
and the individual level. Hypotheses at the individual level should be treated differently
than those at the dyad level to account for both the negotiator and their counterpart’s
effects of relationship-building and their individual subjective value perceptions (Kashy
& Kenny, 2000).
Dyad–Level Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1. Subjective negotiation outcomes of post-negotiation
trustworthiness (H1a), rapport (H1b), and interest in future interaction (H1c) are
expected to relate to the number of relationship-building behaviors within a dyad.
Specifically, more joint relationship-building behaviors displayed in the
negotiation will relate to more positive, dyadic subjective outcomes.
Individual–Level Hypotheses
Hypothesis 2. Negotiators will report higher levels of subjective outcomes of
post-negotiation trustworthiness (H2a), rapport (H2b), and interest in future
interaction (H2c) the more their counterparts engage in relationship-building
behaviors.
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Hypothesis 3. Compared to FTF negotiation, e-negotiation will have lower
subjective value outcomes for post-negotiation trustworthiness (H3a), rapport
(H3b), and interest in future interaction (H3c).
Hypothesis 4. Negotiators’ relationship-building behaviors interact with the mode
of negotiation such that increased individual relationship-building leads to more
positive counterpart subjective values in FTF compared to e-negotiation.
Specifically, a focal negotiator’s relationship-building behaviors in FTF
negotiations increase their counterpart’s perceptions of the focal negotiator’s postnegotiation trustworthiness (H4a), rapport (H4b), and interest in future interaction
(H4c) more than in e-negotiations.
Method
Participants
A total of 276 undergraduate students were recruited from two universities to
participate in a simulated negotiation over two years. Originally this thesis had planned
to use data from universities in two different locations, the United States and Germany.
The initial participant pool included 68 dyads from the United States and 72 dyads from
Germany. However, upon further examination, a large portion of data from the German
participants was not available, and only the US sample was used for this study.
The participants received either $8 or psychology research study participation
credit. Two dyads were removed due to a partner in each dyad missing all postnegotiation data. A final sample of 66 dyads (132 individuals) was used for analysis in
this study. The study utilized same-gendered dyads to control for potential confounds of
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mixed sex dyads. The final sample had 74 women (37 female dyads) and 58 men (29
male dyads).
Procedure
The experimental study randomly assigned participants to negotiation condition:
e-negotiation or FTF negotiation. The e-negotiation condition had a further manipulation
that either revealed or did not reveal if the negotiator counterpart was a man or woman.
For the purpose of the current analyses, these two e-negotiations conditions (known
gender and unknown gender) were combined such that there were 25 FTF dyads and 41
e-negotiation dyads.
Each member of the dyad was scheduled to arrive at different rooms for the
experiment and did not meet or see each other before negotiating. Upon arrival,
participants were randomly assigned to e-negotiation or face-to-face negotiation
condition. Participants first completed the consent form (See Appendix E). After this,
they were given ten minutes to read the simulated negotiation instructions regarding their
role in the negotiations (see Appendix F).
The simulated negotiation was adapted from the Pelican Landing task by Brodt
(2009), a negotiation between a city planner and real estate developer about real estate
development issues. The number of tasks were reduced to four issues: financing, open
space, retail space, and height of buildings. Negotiators had competing interests for three
issues, where one party preferred the highest value, and the other party preferred the
lowest value. Negotiators had similar interests for one issue where both parties preferred
the highest value. Participants received information regarding the four issues with
associated values between 350 and 900 points as their respective payoffs. Participants
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were told that if no agreement was reached, a minimum agreement of 350 points would
be assumed.
After negotiators read through the negotiation simulation instructions and planned
for a total of 10 minutes, participants completed a pre-negotiation survey (Appendix G)
containing questions about their plans for the negotiation and expectations for their
counterpart. Then, participants were told about the negotiation format they would be
using (FTF or e-negotiation). Participants negotiating by computer stayed in their
individual rooms and used an instant messaging program to negotiate. The software
facilitated real-time communication between participants. Those in the FTF condition
were brought into the same room, meeting for the first time, and began negotiating.
Participants were given up to 35 minutes to complete the negotiation and were
given a time warning when they had 5 minutes left. If participants did not reach any
agreements after 35 minutes, the negotiation was declared an impasse. After negotiating,
participants completed the post-negotiation survey, read the study debrief, and received
payments or class credit for their participation.
Measures
Relationship Building
Relationship building involves positive perceptions of the relationship between
members of a dyad and is important to subjective value in negotiation (Curhan et al.,
2006; Curhan & Brown, 2011). In this study it was measured by the frequency of one of
eight types of relationship-building language. These statements were greetings, questions
(Fairfield & Allred, 2007), acknowledgements, statements of agreement (Hine et al.,
2009), concessions, small talk (Morris et al., 2002), colloquial speech, polite speech, and
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statements that indicated care or concern for the counterpart (see Appendix A for
codebook).
Greetings were defined by participants greeting each other at the beginning or end
of negotiations (e.g., “good afternoon.”). Questions were operationalized as participants
asking questions to the other participant (e.g., “is this amount fair?”). Acknowledgements
were defined as participants reflecting or admitting to something their counterpart said
(e.g., “I understand that the city does not have that budget right now”). Statements of
agreement were operationalized as a participant agreeing with or having a positive tone
towards a statement their counterpart made (e.g., a participant states “I completely agree”
to their counterpart stating, “I would like to have tall buildings”). Concessions were
defined as statements in which a participant accepts some sort of compromise or loss to
their goals. An example of a concessionary statement would be if, after both parties
discuss what their goals are for an issue, a participant asks, “Can we meet in the middle?”
Small talk was operationalized as participants discussing information other than
negotiation material. An example of this is a participant saying, “I hope you’re doing well
today.” Colloquial speech was defined as informal language; for example, a participant
replies “sure thing” to a counterpart’s statement. Polite speech was defined as a statement
that was phrased in a way that indicated positive tone and politeness towards the
counterpart. For example, a participant states “nice work” to their counterpart after they
resolve an issue. Lastly, statements that indicate care or concern for the counterpart were
defined as language that indicated the participant showed concern about the counterpart
or their goals (e.g., “I do not want one of us to leave this negotiation dissatisfied”).
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As a note, though humor is an ideal indicator of relationship building, humor was
not coded due to the challenges of recognizing humor in a written context using solely
language. For example, an emoticon of a smiling face could indicate a humorous
statement in the e-negotiation condition, but there is no similar comparison for that type
of statement in the FTF transcript.
A relationship-building statement could conceivably fit more than one category
but it was coded as one statement. For example, the statement “Hello, how are you on
this rainy day?” could be considered a greeting, a question, or small talk. In this coding,
the eight types of relationship-building statements were examples and not required to be
placed into one of the eight distinct categories. Relationship building statements were
coded by role (developer and planner) and summed to arrive at a total relationshipbuilding score for each negotiation. More coding details are provided in the results
section.
Subjective Values
Trustworthiness. Trustworthiness was measured in both the pre-negotiation
questionnaire and post-negotiation questionnaire through an adapted version of the
trustworthiness scale (Mayer et al., 1995) (see Appendix C). A total of nineteen items
were scored across three dimensions of trustworthiness on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = Disagree
Strongly, 7 = Agree Strongly). An example item is, “My counterpart will go out of
his/her way to help me.”
Rapport. Two dimensions (process and relationship dimensions) of the Subjective Value
Inventory (SVI) that make up rapport were used to assess subjective value outcomes after
the negotiation (Curhan et al., 2006) (see Appendix D). A total of eight items were scored
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on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = Not at all, 7 = Perfectly). An example item is, “How satisfied are
you with your relationship with your counterpart as a result of this negotiation?”
Interest in Future Interaction. Willingness to negotiate and interact in the future was
measured via three items from an adapted work-based backlash scale (Amanatullah &
Tinsley, 2013) and through one item about willingness to negotiate again adapted from
Naquin & Paulson (2003) (See Appendix E). The first three items were scored on a scale
from 1 to 7 (1 = Not at all, 7 = Extremely). An example item is, “How interested would
you be in working with your counterpart in the future?” The item regarding willingness to
negotiate was scored between 1 to 100 (1 = Not at all, 100 = Without hesitation). This
item is, “Based upon your experience in this negotiation, to what degree are you willing
to have future dealings (i.e., negotiations) with your counterpart? Please give your
response on a scale of 1 to 100, with 1 being not at all and 100 being without hesitation.”
Other Variables
Additional measures in the original study are not a part of the current
examination. Intended first offers, limits, goals, (Naquin & Kurtzberg, 2010; Mayer et al.,
1995), and distributive negotiation self-efficacy were measured in the pre-negotiation
questionnaire (Sullivan et al., 2006). The post-negotiation questionnaire included
negotiators’ understanding of integrative potential (Thompson & Hastie, 1990).
Additional measures included major, English fluency, demographics, and questions used
to assess participants’ comfort with technology.
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Results
Scoring
Individual subjective value outcomes
Each subjective value measure (rapport, trustworthiness, and interest in future
interaction) was averaged by the number of items in the measure to arrive at a single
composite score for each construct. Interest in future interaction initially consisted of
three items on one scale and one additional item. Due to the redundancy of items and for
greater internal consistency, the item utilizing a separate scale was not used in the
analyses, and the remaining three items were averaged to create an aggregate subjective
value measure for interest in future interaction.
For all scales, mean imputation was used to calculate average subjective value
scores where data was missing. Mean imputation was only used for participants missing
three or fewer scores on the trustworthiness items (n = 4) and one or fewer scores on the
rapport and interest in future interaction items (n = 3).
Dyadic subjective value outcomes
Dyadic subjective value outcomes were calculated by taking the average of the
actor and partner’s individual subjective value scores for each dyad. For example, the
actor’s trustworthiness score and the partner’s trustworthiness score in a dyad were
averaged to arrive at their dyadic trustworthiness score.
Coding Negotiation Transcripts
Relationship building
Statements were coded as relationship building by reviewing each negotiation
transcript. The total number of relationship-building statements made by each negotiator
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and the overall number of relationship-building statements in a negotiation were
recorded. Three undergraduate and two graduate students were trained to identify
relationship-building statements in the context of this study. Each coder was given a set
of negotiation transcripts to code individually. The number of relationship-building
statements in each transcript was reviewed and agreed upon by the author and an
additional coder, and discrepancies were resolved for greater reliability. Each
relationship-building statement was counted as a single instance even if a statement could
be classified into more than one type of relationship-building category.
Though the frequency of relationship-building statements in each relationshipbuilding category was not measured, there were some general trends. Asking questions
was the most frequently coded relationship-building statement, while colloquial speech
and indications of care or concern for the counterpart were some of the least frequently
coded types of relationship-building statements. Though greetings did not make up the
bulk of relationship-building statements, the presence of this type of statement was coded
in almost every single transcript.
Descriptive statistics and correlations are reported in Table 1, and descriptive
statistics by condition are reported in Table 2.
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Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations and Zero-Order Correlations
Variable
n
M
SD
1
2

3

4

5

1. Ind Relationship Bldg
135 13.60 6.41
–
2. Total Relationship Bldg 135 27.20 11.20 0.87
–
3. Trustworthiness
131 4.74 0.96 -0.14 -0.08 0.93
4. Rapport
131 5.31 1.09 -0.06 -0.01 0.74 0.92
5. Future Interaction
130 5.27 1.41 -0.04 -0.06 0.67 0.72 0.91
6. Overall Subjective Value 131 5.40 0.87 -0.11 -0.07 0.65 0.91 0.65 0.91
Note. Cronbach’s alpha values are provided in italics. Correlations are statistically
significant at the p < .05 level (items in bold). Ind Relationship Bldg = individual
relationship building; Total Relationship Bldg = total relationship building; Overall
Subjective Value = composite subjective value from Subjective Value Inventory.
Trustworthiness, Rapport, and Future Interaction were on a 7-point scale. Individual
relationship building and total relationship building were measures of frequency.
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of Primary Study Variables by Condition
E-Negotiation

Face-to-Face Negotiation

Variable

n
M
SD
n
M
SD
1. Ind Relationship Bldg
83
12.0
4.69
50
16.3
7.90
2. Total Relationship Bldg
83
24.0
8.14
50
32.6
13.6
3. Trustworthiness
80
4.87
0.98
49
4.53
0.92
4. Rapport
80
5.35
1.16
49
5.25
0.96
5. Future Interaction
80
5.42
1.41
48
5.05
1.34
Note. N, M and SD are used to represent sample size, mean and standard deviation,
respectively. Ind Relationship Bldg = individual relationship building; Total Relationship
Bldg = total relationship building; Individual relationship building and total relationship
building were measures of frequency.
Dyadic Dependence
I first investigated the degree of dependence due to the dyads by
computing the intraclass correlation (ICC) for the main study variables. ICC values are
reported in Table 3. Positive ICC values indicate similarity between dyads and negative
ICC values indicate dissimilarity between dyads. The absolute value of ICC estimates are
also interpreted as the proportion of variance due to dyad effects (Kashy & Kenny, 2000).
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All ICCs were significantly different from zero, and 35% of the variance in the main
study variables was due to dyads (range 21% to 54%), suggesting the importance of
considering the dyad effect in analyses.
Table 3
Intraclass Correlations of Main Study Variables
Variable
ICC
1. Ind Relationship Bldg
0.54***
2. Trustworthiness
0.30***
3. Rapport
0.35***
4. Future Interaction
0.21**
Note. K = 66 dyads. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. Ind Relationship Bldg = individual
relationship building; Trustworthiness, Rapport, and Future Interaction were on a 7-point
scale. Individual relationship building and total relationship building were measures of
frequency.
Hypothesis Testing
The dyad-level hypothesis was tested by correlating variables. An alpha criterion
of 0.05 was utilized to determine statistical significance. The remaining individual-level
hypotheses were tested using the Actor-Partner Interdependence Model (APIM), a model
of dyadic relationships that predicts actor and partner effects separately while accounting
for interdependence in each dyad (Kashy & Kenny, 2000; Kenny et al., 2002). APIM is a
dyadic multi-level analysis, where individuals are nested within dyads and multilevel
modeling or structural equation modeling can be used to estimate actor and partner
effects (Kenny et al., 2002). In these analyses, multilevel modeling was used via
maximum likelihood (ML) estimation to estimate actor and partner effects and to
examine moderation of actor and partner effects. In each hypothesis, three separate
outcomes were considered: trustworthiness, rapport, and interest in future interaction.
Therefore, for each individual-level hypothesis, three separate models were run.
Figure 1 depicts the APIM model of relationship-building on subjective value outcomes.
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Figure 1
Actor-Partner Interdependence Model of Relationship-building Language on Subjective
Value Outcomes
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APIM analysis depends on distinguishability of dyads, or whether members in a
dyad can be distinguished on some meaningful variable (Kenny et al., 2002). Even if
members can theoretically be distinguished in some way (e.g., by developer or planner
role), it is still advisable to empirically test if the distinguishing feature differentially
relates to outcomes. To test for distinguishability, two separate multilevel models using
ML estimation were run using the “nlme” package in R statistical software (Pinheiro et
al., 2022). The indistinguishable dyad model consisted of equal actor and partner effects,
while the distinguishable model consisted of different actor and partner effects, the main
effect of the distinguishing factor, and accounted for the within-group heteroscedasticity
structure. Because the indistinguishable model is nested within the distinguishable model,
the two multilevel models were compared using a 𝛸2 test to determine distinguishability.
This model comparison was run three times to test each outcome variable separately.
Each model comparison showed that dyads were empirically indistinguishable, or stated
differently, that the role of the negotiator (planner or developer) did not differentially
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relate to the study variables.
After determining that the dyads in this study were empirically indistinguishable,
APIM models were tested by estimating actor, partner, and moderation effects using the
“nlme” package (Pinheiro et al., 2022) in R statistical software. Models were fitted using
the generalized least squares method which allows for nonindependence by correlating
the errors of both members in each dyad. Moderation was tested by grand mean centering
the predictor variable, and including main effects of the actor, partner, and moderator, as
well as two interaction terms: the interaction of the moderator and actor variables and the
interaction of the moderator and partner variables.
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 involved the association of study variables at the dyad level. The
sum of individual relationship building scores and dyad-level subjective outcomes were
used. A one-tailed test was specified due to the directionality of the hypothesis. Dyadic
relationship-building was not significantly correlated with any of the subjective value
outcomes: trustworthiness (r = -0.11, p =.902), rapport (r = -0.03, p = 0.616), and interest
in future interaction (r =-0.10, p = 0.873).
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 involved understanding the role of individual relationship-building
on the counterpart’s subjective outcomes. In APIM, the actor effect is the effect of a
person’s X variable on their own outcome variable, while the partner effect is the effect
of a person’s partner’s X variable on the person’s outcome variable, or interchangeably,
the effect of a person’s X variable on their partner’s outcome variable. Using the APIM
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model, relationship-building was regressed onto each subjective value outcome
separately. Results are shown in Table 4.
Table 4
Multilevel Regression Analyses Predicting Subjective Values from Actor and Partner
Relationship Building
Trustworthiness

Rapport

Future Interaction

Variable
B
SE
df
B
SE
Df
B
SE
df
Relationship-0.033* 0.014 119.53 -0.028 0.016 122.40 -0.015 0.021 110.86
building-A
Relationship0.017
0.014 119.52 0.024 0.016 122.39 -0.001 0.022 110.92
building-P
Note. Relationship-building-A = Actor Relationship Building; Relationship-building-P =
Partner Relationship-building. *p < .05
Hypothesis 2a. APIM results revealed that the partner’s relationship-building did
not significantly predict the actor’s perception of trustworthiness (β = 0.017, SE = 0.014,
p = .219), failing to support Hypothesis 2a. Notably, actor relationship-building
significantly predicted actor perceptions of trustworthiness (β =-0.033, SE = 0.014, p =
0.02) in a different direction than expected. Taken together, these results indicate that in
the negotiation, the effect of an actor’s relationship-building did not significantly affect
how trustworthy the partner thought the actor was. However, actors perceived their
counterpart to be less trustworthy when actors themselves engaged in more relationshipbuilding.
Hypothesis 2b. To test Hypothesis 2b, individual relationship-building was
regressed onto rapport using the APIM. Partner relationship-building did not significantly
predict actor perceptions of rapport (β = 0.024, SE = 0.016, p = 0.131). Hypothesis 2b
was not supported.
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Hypothesis 2c. To test Hypothesis 2c, individual relationship-building was
regressed onto interest in future interaction using the APIM. Partner relationship-building
did not significantly predict interest in future interaction (β = -0.001, SE = 0.021, p =
0.958). Hypothesis 2c was not supported. Overall, results from Hypothesis 2 indicate that
an individual’s relationship-building did not have a significant effect on their partner’s
subjective values after the negotiation.
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 examined e-negotiation or FTF condition as a moderator along with
centered individual relationship building of the actor and partner, and regressed onto
subjective value outcomes in a series of multilevel models. The results of these models
are presented in Table 5.
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Table 5
Multilevel Regression Analyses Predicting Subjective Values from Actor and Partner
Relationship Building and the Moderating Effect of Condition
Trustworthiness
Variable
Condition

B
0.323

Relationshipbuilding-A

-0.021

Relationshipbuilding-P
Condition x
Relationshipbuilding-A

SE
0.215

df
65.69

Rapport
B
0.090

Future Interaction

SE

Df

0.253

66.05

B
0.340

SE
0.304

df
65.54

0.018 120.88 -0.027

0.020 124.47 -0.005

0.028 113.25

0.025

0.018 120.88

0.021

0.020 124.47 -0.002

0.028 113.26

-0.016

0.030 121.46

0.002

0.034 124.90 -0.015

0.046 113.96

Condition x
Relationship- -0.007 0.030 121.46 0.013 0.034 124.89 0.019 0.046 113.98
building-P
Note. Relationship-building is centered. FTF condition = 0, E-Negotiation = 1;
Relationship-building-A = Actor Relationship Building; Relationship-building-P =
Partner Relationship-building.
Hypothesis 3a. Individual relationship-building was regressed onto
trustworthiness with condition as a between-dyads moderator. Condition did not have a
significant main effect on individual perceptions of trustworthiness (β = 0.32, SE = 0.21,
p = 0.132). These results fail to support Hypothesis 3a.
Hypothesis 3b. Individual relationship-building was regressed onto rapport with
condition as a moderator. Condition did not have a significant main effect on individual
perceptions of rapport (β = 0.09, SE = 0.25, p = 0.721). These results fail to support
Hypothesis 3b.
Hypothesis 3c. Individual relationship-building was regressed onto interest in
future interaction with negotiation condition as a moderator. Condition did not have a
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significant main effect on interest in future interaction (β = 0.34, SE = 0.30, p = 0.266).
These results fail to support Hypothesis 3c. Taken together, these results indicate
negotiation condition did not significantly change relationships between actor
relationship-building and partner subjective value perceptions.
Hypothesis 4
The same series of multilevel models used to test Hypothesis 3 were used to
understand interaction effects of condition in Hypothesis 4. The results of these models
are presented in Table 5.
Hypothesis 4a. The interaction of negotiation condition and actor relationshipbuilding on partner perceptions of trustworthiness was not significant (β = -0.007, SE =
0.030, p = 0.830). In other words, negotiation condition and the actor’s relationshipbuilding did not significantly influence how trustworthy the partner perceived the actor to
be. The results fail to support Hypothesis 4a.
Hypothesis 4b. The interaction of negotiation condition and actor relationshipbuilding on partner perceptions of rapport was not significant (β = 0.013, SE = 0.034, p =
0.712). These results fail to support Hypothesis 4b.
Hypothesis 4c. The interaction of negotiation condition and actor relationshipbuilding on partner’s interest in future interaction was not significant (β = 0.019, SE =
0.046, p = 0.688). These results fail to support Hypothesis 4c. Taken together, these
results indicate negotiation condition and an individual’s relationship-building did not
significantly influence partner’s subjective value perceptions.
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Discussion
The hypotheses in this study were unsupported by this data. First, total
relationship-building did not significantly relate to dyadic perceptions of trustworthiness,
rapport, or interest in future interaction. For Hypothesis 2, actor relationship-building did
not significantly predict partner subjective values, but based on the direction of the
estimate, actor relationship-building significantly and negatively related to the actor’s
perception of their counterpart’s trustworthiness. In other words, results lean toward the
possibility that as the actor engaged in more relationship-building, they perceived their
partner to be less trustworthy. This relationship was in an unexpected direction and would
suggest that the frequency of relationship-building language may not have been key to
perceptions of subjective value. Additionally, the e-negotiation or FTF condition did not
significantly impact the three subjective values, and the interaction of condition with
relationship building did not significantly predict the three subjective values for the actor
nor the partner.
There are many explanations for the lack of support for the hypotheses in this
study. Past studies suggest that there should be positive and moderate bivariate
relationships between relationship building and subjective values (Curhan & Brown,
2011; de Dreu et al., 2000; Purdy et al., 2000). In this study, individual and total
relationship building had nonsignificant relationships with the three subjective value
outcomes. Because of the historical evidence that relationship building relates positively
to subjective value, it is unlikely that relationship building in this study was unrelated to
the three outcomes. However, some explanations for the lack of findings could be in how
relationship building was operationalized, a potential reciprocal expectation of
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relationship building by negotiators, and the use of deception or negative behaviors that
may have overshadowed the positive effects of relationship-building.
Non-verbal and paraverbal indicators of relationship building were not measured
in this study due to the absence of these cues in e-negotiation. It is possible that in the
FTF condition, non-verbal and paraverbal cues may have contributed more to relationship
building than solely language. Relationship building could have also been measured in
additional ways. For example, additional indicators of relationship building, such as
humor, could have been an additional type of relationship-building statement. Humor was
not coded in this study due to the challenges of recognizing humor in written transcripts
across negotiation mediums. Relationship building was measured by capturing the
frequency of relationship-building statements across negotiation partners. Another way to
operationalize relationship building would have been to create a proportion of
relationship-building statements across total words in negotiation transcripts to account
for both the total time it took to negotiate and the proportion of relationship-building
words to all words in each negotiation. This would follow a similar procedure to Hine
and colleagues’ (2009) treatment of agreeable language in which they categorized the
proportion of positive to negative language in negotiations. Lastly, it is possible that
different types of relationship-building language have different impact. Perhaps more
weight could have been given to certain relationship-building statements that may be
more important to subjective value than other statements. For example, indicating care
for the counterpart is likely to contribute more to subjective value than asking questions.
In this research, questions were one of the most frequently coded relationship-building
statements. All questions were given the same weight though they may not have
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contributed equally to relationship building; some types of questions are important for
discovering counterpart preferences, while different types of questions may build trust
and rapport. Nuanced measurement of relationship-building may yield more insight into
negotiators’ perceptions of subjective value.
The unexpected and significant negative relationship between actor relationship
building and actor perceptions of their counterpart’s trustworthiness may also provide
insight into negotiators’ intent and expectations when engaging in relationship building.
As negotiators engaged in more relationship building, they perceived their counterpart to
be less trustworthy. This may suggest that negotiators use relationship building as a
strategic tactic to enhance cooperation, and thus their own satisfaction with the
negotiation outcome, but if these behaviors are not reciprocated by the counterpart, the
negotiator may be less satisfied and have lower subjective value perceptions after the
negotiation. Considering negotiator intent and expectations could provide a promising
avenue for better understanding subjective value in negotiations.
A final explanation for relationship building failing to predict subjective values
could be in either party’s use of deception or negative behavior that may have attenuated
the relationship. When a party finds that their counterpart has been deceptive, the
deceived party is more likely to punish their counterpart compared to when deception
was not perceived; in this case, both negotiators were more likely to use deception in the
future and had lower joint outcomes (Boles et al., 2000; Shapiro & Bies, 1994).
Additionally, when negotiators use deception, their counterparts rate them as less
trustworthy and less trustful, and the counterparts are less willing to work with the other
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party in the future (Boles et al., 2000; Tinsley et al., 2002). Therefore, when deception or
negative behavior is perceived by the counterpart, subjective values are impacted.
The absence of differences between the FTF or e-negotiation conditions was also
unexpected. Mean subjective value outcomes were all higher in the e-negotiation
condition than the FTF condition. One explanation for this could be that this study relied
on an undergraduate student sample; studies have shown that young adults prefer online
communication with unknown individuals compared to middle and late adult age groups
(Thayer & Ray, 2006). Because participants were “technology natives” (those raised with
online technology and social media), they may have had a preference to negotiate in the
virtual condition compared to FTF. SIP theory (Walther, 1992) would support this claim,
in which individuals can create meaningful relationships over computer-based
interactions. Still, much is unknown on how individual differences like this impact
technology use and influence negotiation outcomes across different negotiation mediums.
Although the hypotheses in this study were unsupported, this research still
contributes to the negotiation literature. The unexpected direction of relationship-building
language and subjective values suggests that solely written or spoken language may not
contribute to the bulk of subjective value. Future research should consider how nonverbal
and paraverbal relationship-building cues may differ in eliciting higher subjective values
compared to solely written or spoken language. Second, participants in this study
indicated higher mean subjective value outcomes in the e-negotiation condition compared
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to the FTF condition. Future research may consider how age relates to preferences for
specific negotiation mediums and how this contributes to subjective value perceptions.
The findings are important to consider in light of limitations to this study.
Because of the cross-sectional design of the study, causal relationships cannot be
assumed between relationship building and subjective value perceptions. A longitudinal,
multi-negotiation study may provide a better basis for understanding the direction of
influence between negotiation condition, relationship-building and subjective value
outcomes. Another limitation of this study is the sample size. The study was adequately
powered to detect actor effects but required 159 dyads to adequately detect partner
effects. Many relationships were close to reaching marginal significance; thus, a larger
sample size would likely result in better detection of actor-partner effects.
Lastly, the sample consisted of undergraduate students receiving class credit or a
paid incentive to participate in the study. This sample was specifically chosen because
they were not experienced negotiators and would be more comparable to each other on
this factor. Having negotiation experience has been found to lead to different negotiation
outcomes (Mazei et al. 2015). Questions still remain on how negotiation experience and
technology experience might play a role.
As the e-negotiation medium becomes more prevalent, this research can offer
value regarding the interplay between negotiation condition, relationship-building, and
subjective values in negotiation. Future research can explore the intent behind
relationship-building in negotiations and how this relates to the negotiator’s own
subjective value perceptions. Because this study took place before the COVID-19
pandemic, the effect of negotiation medium may be different than if the study was done
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at the present time. FTF negotiation may look different in the context of infection
concerns and e-negotiation may also look different now that virtual work is much more
prevalent, and future research would benefit from exploring relationships across these
“new” conditions.
Research has shown mixed outcomes for computer-mediated negotiation
(Thompson et al., 2010). Still, with the advent of the new remote workplace, workers will
not be able to avoid e-negotiation. There are several variables that may affect the
relationship between the negotiation medium and success in a negotiation, and it is
critical to understand how patterns of behavior relate to negotiation outcomes when
communicating through technology. As communication becomes increasingly reliant on
the virtual medium, organizational research can benefit by exploring how individuals can
strategize and build relationships in the e-negotiation format to drive different objectives,
allocate important resources, and facilitate workplace outcomes.
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Appendix A: Relationship Building Codebook

Relationship-building
behavior

General Examples

Greetings

“Hello”
“Nice to meet you”
“Good afternoon”

Questions

“How are you today?”
“Do you agree with me?”
“What do you think?”

Acknowledgement

“I hope you’re well.”
“Have a good day.”
“It’s almost the weekend.”

Assent/Agreement

“Yup”
“I totally agree.”
“Sure”
*Don’t include solely “yes” unless it is used in a way that is
not just confirming an answer but is used to agree with the
statement

Concessions

“That is a good point.”
“Could we meet in the middle?”

Small Talk
Colloquial Speech
Polite Speech
Indicating care or concern
for counterpart

“I hope you’re well.”
“Have a good day.”
“It’s almost the weekend.”
“Yup”
“Sure thing!”
“Nice work”
“If possible, I would like to…”
“Perfect”
“I do not want one of us to leave this negotiation dissatisfied”
“This is in your best interest”
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Appendix B: Post-Negotiation Trustworthiness Measure
Trustworthiness was measured using 19 items. A Likert Scale (1 – 7) was used to
measure agreement with anchors Disagree Strongly (1) to Agree Strongly (7).

My counterpart was very capable in negotiating
My counterpart was knowledgeable about negotiating
I felt very confident about my counterpart’s negotiation skills
My counterpart was well qualified with respect to negotiating
My counterpart was very concerned about my welfare
My needs and desires were very important to my counterpart
My counterpart did NOT knowingly do anything to hurt me
My counterpart really looked out for what is important to me
My counterpart went out of his/her way to help me
My counterpart had a strong sense of justice
I never had to wonder whether my counterpart would stick to his/her word
My counterpart tried hard to be fair in dealings with me
My counterpart 's actions and behaviors were NOT very consistent
I liked my counterpart’s values
Sound principles seem to have guided my counterpart's behavior
My counterpart was open about his/her motivess and interests during the negotiation
My counterpart shared her/his feelings during the negotiation
My counterpart shared relevant information during the negotiation
I always knew what my counterpart felt and thought during the negotiation
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Appendix C: Rapport Measure
Rapport was measured using 8 items. A Likert Scale (1 – 7) was used to measure
agreement.
Do you feel your counterpart(s) listened to your concerns?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not at
Moderately
Perfectly
all
Would you characterize the negotiation process as fair?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not at
Moderately
Perfectly
all
How satisfied are you with the ease (or difficulty) of reaching an agreement?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not at all
Moderately
Perfectly
satisfied
satisfied
satisfied
Did your counterpart(s) consider your wishes, opinions, or needs?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not at all
Moderately
Perfectly
What kind of “overall” impression did your counterpart(s) make on you?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Extremely
Neither
Extremely
negative
negative
positive
nor
positive
How satisfied are you with your relationship with your counterpart(s) as a result of this
negotiation?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not at
Moderately
Perfectly
all
Did the negotiation make you trust your counterpart(s)?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not at all
Moderately
Perfectly
Did the negotiation build a good foundation for a future relationship with your
counterpart(s)?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not at
Moderately
Perfectly
all
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Appendix D: Interest in Future Interaction Measure
Interest in future interaction was measured using 4 items. A Likert Scale (1 – 7) was used
to measure agreement with anchors Not at all (1) to Extremely (7). The last item used a 1100 scale to measure agreement.

1. How interested would you be in working with your counterpart in the future?

2. If you were the project manager on a future work assignment, how likely would
you be to ask your counterpart to be part of the project team?

3. Is your counterpart the type of person you like to work with?

4. Based upon your experience in this negotiation, to what degree are you willing to
have future dealings (i.e., negotiations) with your counterpart? Please give your
response on a scale of 1 to 100, with 1 being not at all and 100 being without
hesitation.
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Appendix E: Consent Form

ADULT CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH
STUDY ON PEOPLE’S PERCEPTIONS AND BEHAVIORS IN TWO-PERSON
INTERACTIONS
Principal Investigator: Alice F. Stuhlmacher, Ph.D.
Institution: DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois, USA
Department (School, College): Psychology Department, College of Science and Health
Collaborators: Jens Mazei, University of Muenster, Germany
What is the purpose of this research?
We are asking you to be in a research study because we are trying to learn more about
people’s perceptions and behaviors in two-person interactions, particularly those that
might occur in negotiation. This study is being conducted by Dr. Alice Stuhlmacher at
DePaul. There may be other people on the research team assisting with the study and data
collection.
We hope to include about 260 people in the research.
Why are you being asked to be in the research?
You are invited to participate in this study because you engage in interactions with other
people regularly, are likely to negotiate at various times in the future, and are a fluent
English speaker and reader. You must be age 18 or older to be in this study. This study is
not approved for the enrollment of people under the age of 18.
What is involved in being in the research study?
If you agree to be in this study, being in the research involves engaging in a negotiation
as a specific type of interaction. We are interested in people’s behavior and how they
perceive such situations.
This is the procedure for the study.
•
•
•

First, you will read detailed instructions and information concerning the
negotiation and your priorities.
After this, you will receive a questionnaire on your plans and expectations for the
negotiation.
Then you will negotiate with your counterpart. Given that the aim of this research
is to examine how people behave in such interactions, your negotiation will be
recorded in order to get an accurate record of what was said.
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•

Finally, you will receive another questionnaire on your experiences from the
negotiation.

Importantly, all data in this study are confidential. While we will need your signature at
the end of the experiment when you received payment for your participation, your name
will not be stored in a way that can be linked to the data. Furthermore, all data will only
be used for research purposes.
How much time will this take?
This study will take approximately 60 minutes to complete.
Are there any risks involved in participating in this study?
Being in this study does not involve any risks other than what you would encounter in
daily life. As in your daily interactions, you may feel unsure about the best course of
action in negotiating or uncomfortable about answering certain questions. You do not
have to answer any question you do not want to.
Are there any benefits to participating in this study?
You will not personally benefit from being in this study.
We hope that what we learn will help other researchers, negotiators, employees and
policy makers in improving the quality of interactions.
Is there any kind of payment, reimbursement or credit for being in this study?
You will receive $8 cash for your participation. If you do not complete the study, we are
unable to provide payment. Upon completing the study, you will need to sign your name
to show that you received the money and your name will not be linked to the data.
Can you decide not to participate?
Your participation is voluntary, which means you can choose not to participate. There
will be no negative consequences, penalties, or loss of benefits if you decide not to
participate or change your mind later and withdraw from the research after you begin
participating. Your decision whether or not to be in the research will not affect your
standing with DePaul University.
Who will see my study information and how will the confidentiality of the information
collected for the research be protected?
The research records will be kept and stored securely. Your information will be combined
with information from other people taking part in the study. When we write about the
study or publish a paper to share the research with other researchers, we will write about
the combined information we have gathered. We will not include your name or any
information that will directly identify you. We will make every effort to prevent anyone
who is not on the research team from knowing that you gave us information, or what that
information is. However, some people might review or copy our records that may
identify you in order to make sure we are following the required rules, laws, and
regulations. For example, the DePaul University Institutional Review Board, or the
funding agency for the research, the German Research Foundation (Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG) may want to audit the files. No names will be stored with
the conversations. The records of the interaction will be stored a in locked office on a
password protected computer belonging to Dr. Alice Stuhlmacher for no more than 1
year, and that following the removal of all identifying information the data will be
archived indefinitely.
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Who should be contacted for more information about the research?
Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, please ask
any questions that might come to mind now. Later, if you have questions, suggestions,
concerns, or complaints about the study or you want to get additional information or
provide input about this research, you can contact the researcher, Dr. Stuhlmacher,
astuhlma@depaul.edu, 773-325-2050 in the Psychology department of DePaul
University.
This research has been reviewed and approved by the DePaul Institutional Review Board
(IRB). If you have questions about your rights as a research subject you may contact
Susan Loess-Perez, DePaul University’s Director of Research Compliance, in the Office
of Research Services at 312-362-7593 or by email at sloesspe@depaul.edu.
You may also contact DePaul’s Office of Research Services if:
•
•
•

Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the research
team.
You cannot reach the research team.
You want to talk to someone besides the research team.

You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records.
Statement of Consent from the Subject:
I have read the above information. I have had all my questions and concerns answered.
By signing below, I indicate my consent to be in the research.
Signature:_______________________________________________
Printed name: ____________________________________________
Date: _______________
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Appendix F: Simulated Negotiation Instructions
RiverBend Development Negotiation

Real Estate Developer
You are a chief real estate developer preparing for an upcoming negotiation with a chief city
planner. You hope to resolve the three remaining issues that had stalled the approval of
“RiverBend”, a residential community proposed for the city’s “Old Town”, so that
construction could soon begin.
RiverBend
You are working as a chief real estate developer for a real estate development and property
management company, which owned a lot of the property in Old Town. You are interested in
turning Old Town into a residential community containing a combination of condominiums
and rental units. “RiverBend”, as the project was called, was designed to include a small
marina also. The local media had tentatively endorsed the proposed development.
You have recently completed a similar development, called Miraloma Pointe, in a nearby
town. After a shaky beginning, Miraloma Pointe now seems to be doing well. You think
that RiverBend is just the type of development that could generate much needed new
business.
The past decade had not been kind to the real estate business. In the past, interest in real
estate developing was high, as were the profits. A lot of growth was taking place in the cities
nearby, and you could boast of a dozen medium or large-scale projects in various stages of
planning or construction such as the Divisadero Center, or the award winning Latimer
Towers. Not only were the buildings full (thus generating large rents or management fees),
but the demand for more construction was high. It seemed that everyone wanted to live
in one of your buildings.
Unfortunately, and suddenly (as it appeared to you in retrospect), everything came to a
standstill. Not only did new urban construction slow down, but also people and companies
started leaving the cities for other states or the less expensive suburbs. The opening of the
interstate highway west of the city, instead of bringing people to the city, seemed to have the
opposite effect. Bedroom communities sprang up overnight along the interstate corridor.
Not only do you find suburban tract houses and shopping malls aesthetically
displeasing, you knew they represented a loss to your business. As demand for urban living
had dropped, so had rents, sales, and new construction.
After surviving some lean years, you are now poised to take advantage of many young
professionals’ renewed interest in living and working in the city. That is why you are excited
about RiverBend.
But you know that city planners, although welcoming new projects in the area, are also eager
to seek concessions from a real estate developer before agreeing to pursue a project.
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The ”Old Town”-Discussions
As you review the discussions with the city planners, it appears that four issues still need to
be resolved with the chief planner for the city:
(1) City Financing: Government financing was almost always less expensive for a project
such as RiverBend than financing by banks or other commercial lenders. Also, because
of your current financial condition, you do not expect to still qualify for the “preferred
customer” rate that you had obtained from most banks in the past.
(2) Retail Space: The square-footage rental value of the rental space that had been included
at previous projects was greater than the residential square-footage value. You are thus
willing to increase retail space at River Bend.
(3) Open Space: Urban residential developments are more and more frequently committing a
percentage of their real estate to an open area, accessible to the public as well as the
residents. Generally the open space would be nicely landscaped and lighted, and it would
often include park benches and paths. You, however, view open space as wasted space; i.e.,
space that you would be unable to build on.
(4) Height: People are almost always willing to pay an increased sales price or rent to be
higher up. You know that this would be especially true at River Bend with a westward view
over the river of the city and beyond.

You considered alternative resolutions for each of the issues and thought about their
importance. In order to understand these feelings better, you assigned relative points to each
alternative (Exhibit 1, see next page) and noted the highest and lowest attainable values
were 900 and 0, respectively. Also, you determined that 350 was the value of a no deal in this
negotiation; that is, you would rather walk away from the negotiation than settle for a deal
worth less than 350 points.
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Exhibit 1: Your Payoff Schedule
Confidential – not to be disclosed to your counterpart
City financing

Points

Open space

Points

$500,000
$625,000
$750,000
$875,000
$1,000,000

0
60
120
180
240

30%
25%
20%
15%
10%

0
15
30
45
60

Retail space

Points

Height

Points

0 sq. ft.
1500 sq. ft.
3000 sq. ft.
4500 sq. ft.
6000 sq. ft.

0
100
200
300
400

2 stories
3 stories
4 stories
5 stories
6 stories

0
50
100
150
200

Important information:
Please note that it is not possible to agree on alternatives other than those described in the
payoff schedule. To give an example, it is not possible to agree on an amount of $550,000
city financing.
Furthermore, please do not discuss or disclose any information related to your personal
background (e.g., your age or your major) during the interaction. This ensures that
interactions can be compared.

Please inform your experimenter once you have read and understood your instructions.
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RiverBend Development Negotiation

Chief City Planner
You are a chief city planner preparing for an upcoming negotiation with a chief real estate
developer. You hope to resolve the three remaining issues that had stalled the approval
of “RiverBend”, a residential community proposed for the city’s “Old Town”, so that
construction could soon begin.
River Bend
You are working as a chief city planner for a larger city in the Midwest. Old Town was the
historic district along the east bank of the Green River, which had formed the core of the
original city’s settlement. A local real estate development and property management
company owned a lot of the property in Old Town and is interested in turning Old Town into
a residential community containing a combination of condominiums and rental units.
“RiverBend”, as the project was called, was designed to include a small marina also. The
local media had tentatively endorsed the proposed development.
A similar development called Miraloma Pointe, had been recently completed in a nearby
town. After a shaky beginning, Miraloma Pointe now seems to be doing
well. You think that RiverBend is just the type of development that could generate much
needed new business.
The past decade had not been kind to the city. In the past, interest in the city was high, as
were city revenues. A lot of growth was taking place in your city and the cities nearby,
and the city could boast of a dozen medium or large-scale projects in various stages of
planning or construction such as the Divisadero Center, or the award winning Latimer
Towers. Not only were the buildings full (thus generating large property or sales tax
revenues), but the demand for more construction was high. It seemed that everyone wanted to
live in the city.
Unfortunately, and suddenly (as it appeared to you in retrospect), everything came to a
standstill. Not only did new urban construction slow down, but also people and companies
started leaving the cities for other states or the less expensive suburbs. The opening of the
interstate highway west of the city, instead of bringing people to the city, seemed to have the
opposite effect. Bedroom communities sprang up overnight along the interstate corridor.
Not only did you find suburban tract houses and shopping malls aesthetically
displeasing, you knew they represented a loss of city revenue. As demand for urban living
had dropped, so had rents, sales, and new construction.
After surviving some lean years, you are now poised to take advantage of many young
professionals’ renewed interest in living and working in the city. That is why you are excited
about RiverBend.
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But you know that real estate developers, although interested in launching projects in the
area, are also eager to seek concessions from a city planner before agreeing to pursue a
project.
Page Break

The ”Old Town”-Discussions
As you reviewed the discussions with the real estate developers, it appears that four issues
still need to be resolved with the chief real estate developer.
(1) City Financing: Government financing was almost always less expensive for a project
such as RiverBend than financing by banks or other commercial lenders. Also,
because of the city’s current financial condition, you do not expect that you could lend as
much financial support as you might have in the past.
(2) Retail Space: Some people were interested in the possibility of establishing a retail
“center” at RiverBend. However, such a center would increase the traffic in the area so
that people might be less willing to move to Old Town. You are thus willing to decrease
retail space at River Bend.
(3) Open Space: Urban residential developments are more and more frequently committing a
percentage of their real estate to an open area, accessible to the public as well as the
residents. Generally the open space would be nicely landscaped and lighted, and it would
often include park benches and paths. This action would be beneficial to a city, because city
resources would not be used to develop or maintain the open space.
(4) Height: People are almost always willing to move to a city where they can live higher up.
You know that this would be especially true at River Bend with a westward view over the
river of the city and beyond.

You considered alternative resolutions for each of the issues and thought about their
importance. In order to understand these feelings better, you assigned relative points to each
alternative (Exhibit 1, see next page) and noted the highest and lowest attainable values
were 900 and 0, respectively. Also, you determined that 350 was the value of a no deal in this
negotiation; that is, you would rather walk away from the negotiation than settle for a deal
worth less than 350 points.
Page Break

57
Exhibit 1: Your Payoff Schedule
Confidential – not to be disclosed to your counterpart

City financing

Points

Open space

Points

$500,000
$625,000
$750,000
$875,000
$1,000,000

240
180
120
60
0

30%
25%
20%
15%
10%

400
300
200
100
0

Retail space

Points

Height

Points

0 sq. ft.
1500 sq. ft.
3000 sq. ft.
4500 sq. ft.
6000 sq. ft.

60
45
30
15
0

2 stories
3 stories
4 stories
5 stories
6 stories

0
50
100
150
200

Important information:
Please note that it is not possible to agree on alternatives other than those described in the
payoff schedule. To give an example, it is not possible to agree on an amount of $550,000
city financing.
Furthermore, please do not discuss or disclose any information related to your personal
background (e.g., your age or your major) during the interaction. This ensures that
interactions can be compared.

Please inform your experimenter once you have read and understood your instructions.
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Appendix G: Pre-Negotiation Survey
Dear Participant,
In a few minutes you will negotiate with your counterpart via a chat program on the
computer
Below are several questions concerning the upcoming negotiation. Please indicate the
answer that most accurately reflects your opinion. Some of the questions are similar to
one another; this is primarily to ensure the validity and reliability of the questionnaire.
Simply answer each question independently, without reference to any of the other
questions.
1. Regarding your plans for the upcoming negotiation: Please indicate ...
... the ideal number of points you want to achieve in the negotiation (that
is your goal)
... the least number of points you are willing to accept before walking
away from the negotiation at an impasse (that is your limit)
Please indicate on a 100-point scale (0 = no confidence, 100 = full confidence) your
confidence that you can use the following tactics successfully in the following
negotiation:
2. Persuade the other negotiator to make most of the concessions.

__________ (0 to 100)

3. Convince the other negotiator to agree with me.

__________(0 to 100)

4. Gain the upper hand against the other negotiator

__________(0 to 100)

5. Prevent the other negotiator from exploiting your weaknesses.

__________(0 to 100)

Your opinion:

Disagree strongly

Agree strongly

6. I am afraid that my counterpart will
perceive me to be a pushy person.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7. I worry that my counterpart will
punish me for being too demanding.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8. I always place the needs of others
above my own.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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9. For me to be happy, I need others to
be happy.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

10. I have difficulty satisfying my own
needs when they interfere with the
1
needs of others.

2

3

4

5

6

7
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These last questions concern your expectations about your counterpart in the upcoming
negotiation.
Disagree strongly
11. My counterpart will be very
capable in negotiating.
12. My counterpart will be
knowledgeable about negotiating.
13. I feel very confident about my
counterpart’s negotiation skills.
14. My counterpart is well qualified
with respect to negotiating.
15. My counterpart will be very
concerned about my welfare.
16. My needs and desires will be very
important to my counterpart.
17. My counterpart would not
knowingly do anything to hurt me.
18. My counterpart will really look
out for what is important to me.
19. My counterpart will go out of
his/her way to help me.
20. My counterpart will have a strong
sense of justice.
21. I will not wonder whether my
counterpart will stick to his/her word.
22. My counterpart will try hard to be
fair in dealings with me.
23. My counterpart 's actions and
behaviors will not be very consistent.
24. I will like my counterpart’s
values.

Agree strongly

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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25. Sound principles will guide my
counterpart's behavior.
26. My counterpart will be open
about her/his motives and interests
during the negotiation.
27. My counterpart will share
relevant information during the
negotiation.
28. I will always know what my
counterpart thinks and feels during
negotiation.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

29. I will negotiate with my counterpart (mark one): Ο Via computer
Face-to-face

Ο

